When doing window access security checks, make sure to treat wyciwyg URIs as

equivalent to their creators.  Bug 270414, r+sr=jst


git-svn-id: svn://10.0.0.236/trunk@168131 18797224-902f-48f8-a5cc-f745e15eee43
This commit is contained in:
bzbarsky%mit.edu
2005-01-21 16:58:45 +00:00
parent 06a6d5340e
commit c4da8e60d3
2 changed files with 33 additions and 12 deletions

View File

@@ -329,11 +329,9 @@ protected:
return t_sec;
}
virtual nsresult FindTarget(const PRUnichar *aTargetName,
PRBool *aIsNewWindow,
nsIDocShell **aResult);
nsresult FindTarget(const PRUnichar *aTargetName,
PRBool *aIsNewWindow,
nsIDocShell **aResult);
PRBool IsFrame();
@@ -347,6 +345,14 @@ protected:
nsresult CheckLoadingPermissions();
// Security checks to prevent frameset spoofing. See comments at
// implementation sites.
static PRBool CanAccessItem(nsIDocShellTreeItem* aTargetItem,
nsIDocShellTreeItem* aAccessingItem,
PRBool aConsiderOpener = PR_TRUE);
static PRBool ValidateOrigin(nsIDocShellTreeItem* aOriginTreeItem,
nsIDocShellTreeItem* aTargetTreeItem);
void SetCurrentURI(nsIURI *aURI, nsIRequest *aRequest);
protected: